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University of Florida Law Review
No. 8

FALL 1951

Vol. IV

REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW
J

_s E. CHACE AND J. NIXON DANIE=, JR.

The basic problem with which this article deals involves the determination of those functions that properly may be performed by
real estate brokers as contrasted with those whose performance should
be left solely to the legal profession. 1 The premise that the right
to practice law is vested exclusively in licensed attorneys 2 has lately
.As a practical matter, only conveyancing and the preparation of those instruments
commonly employed in real estate transactions are involved.
2
1n the beginning of the common law, litigants were denied counsel of any
sort, the reason being that the writ commanding the defendant to appear meant
an appearance in person; attorneys could not be used without special permission
under the king's letters-patent, and they were simply attorneys in fact, 3 BL.
Comma. 25; see State ex rel. Wolfe v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278, 282 (1868); In re Day,
181 IM. 73, 84, 54 N.E. 646, 648 (1899). As time progressed statutes were
enacted permitting attorneys to prosecute or defend any action, even in the
absence of the parties to the suit, ibid. During this period the courts were given
the power to appoint and regulate attorneys, with the result that a monopoly of
practice was secured to those who had been admitted to the practice of law by
the judges; see 6 U. oF Prrr. L. REv. 219 (1940), citing CosareAN, CAsEs AND
OTmH

AuTHOmi-

ON

=m LEGAL NoFEssIoN AD rs

ETmcs 5 (2d ed. 1933).

The Florida statutes in general terms provide for the continuation of the
monopoly thus secured, FLA. STAT. c. 454 (1949). The statutes of a decided
majority of the states, as do the Florida statutes, prohibit in general terms the
practice of law by those unlicensed, and thus leave to the courts the problem of
determining what the practice of law is, e.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 14, §21 (1935);
CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. §7641 (1949); MucH. STAT. ANN. §27.81 (1944); S. D.
CODE §§32.1101, 32.1121 (1939). A substantial number of state statutes forbid
in express terms the drafting of legal papers by laymen, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46,
§2 (1940); GA. CODE §9-9902 (1933); Miss. CODE §§2382, 8682 (Supp. 1948).
The statutes of two states, however, specifically permit a real estate broker to
draw papers incident to a transaction in which he is interested as broker, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§481.02, 481.03 (1949); N. J. STAT. ANN. §2:111-1 (1949). The
legislative enactments of yet other states appear to restrict the practice of law

[2851
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precipitated spirited arguments as to just what constitutes the practice
3
of the law in specific situations.
As our economy has become more mechanical and complex, groups
of laymen have acquired specialized knowledge of particular aspects
of the law and have sought the right to make use of that knowledge
in their businesses. Real estate brokers, for example, have come to
regard the drawing of deeds and the preparation of other legal instruments as essential to the closing of a deal and properly included within

the group of services they are entitled to perform. 4 The legal profession, on the other hand, on the ground that the public should be
protected against unlearned and unskilled advisors in matters relating
to the law, 5 has sought to curtail such activity.
It is true, of course, on grounds of sound public policy, that those
who seek admission to the practice of the law must meet stringent
educational and character standards and, once admitted, must subwith reference to court appearance only, e.g., S. C. CODE §312 (1942); TENN.
CODE §9970 (1932). FLA. STAT. §§83.11, 83.12, 83.21, 83.28 (1951) authorize
landlord's agent to initiate distress for rent action and to file petition for removal of tenant. Some Florida real estate brokers do this in practice.
3
The reports of the American Bar Association Committee on the Unauthorized
Practice of the Law, as well as the cases, indicate that the legal profession has
taken issue with practices of accountants, trust companies, collection agencies, title
companies, law clerks, abstract companies, realtors, notaries public, automotive
associations, insurance adjusters, patent attorneys not licensed to practice law,
investigating services, justices of the peace and tax services, as well as with
practice before administrative agencies by those not licensed to practice law.
4
See Hill, Real Estate Brokers and the Courts, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 72
(1938); Note, 25 NOThE DAME LAW. 346, 348 (1950). And see Report of the
Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 61 A.B.A. REP. 704,
710 (1936): "A militant organization of laymen is the National Association of
Real Estate Boards. In the early summer of 1935, that association threw down the
gauntlet to the legal Profession ...." The American Bar Association Committee
on Unauthorized Practice of the Law "accepted the challenge."
5
The courts universally regard the restrictions placed upon the practice of law
as being primarily for the benefit of the public, and not for the protection of the
bar from competition; see, e.g., Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52
N.E.2d 27 (1943) (not in the protection of the bar from competition but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented by incompetents);
Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935); Clark v. Rearden,
231 Mo. App. 666, 104 S.W.2d 407 (1937) (primarily for benefit of society);
Auerbacher v. Wood, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948);
State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 5 S.E.2d 181 (1939) (not to create
a monopoly in the legal profession or for its protection, but to assure the public
adequate protection in the pursuit of justice). Grievance Committee v. Coryell,
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acribe to one of the strictest codes of ethics known to the professions.6
The restrictions and requirements are heavy; but if these are sound
in principle then the status they create, even though it smacks somewhat of monopoly, is thoroughly justified. 7 Only the skeptic will
contend that the limitation of law practice to licensed lawyers is designed primarily to benefit the legal profession.
SINIPr. Vmasus ColtEx
As a general proposition, the practice of law undoubtedly includes
the preparation of legal instruments.8 Consequently, an individual
not licensed to practice law who drafts such instruments for others
as a business is likely engaged in the unauthorized practice of the law.
A number of courts have taken the position that the mere selection
of the appropriate blank form or the filling-in of that form constitutes
the practice of law. In re Gore,9 for example, a real estate broker
drew simple contracts of purchase in transactions in which he was
interested as broker and also prepared other instruments essential to
the consummation of the deal, including deeds, mortgages, and leases.
Always he selected the appropriate blank when he performed this
service, although he referred the parties to their attorneys in "complicated matters." The Ohio court held that respondent could draft
his own contract of employment as broker, but that when he selected
190 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
6

Tbe Code of Ethics adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida on Jan. 27,

1941, is found at 31 Fz.A.

STAT.

ANN. 398 (1950).

is apparent nevertheless that the limits of the monopoly enjoyed by the
legal profession should be co-extensive with the public policy to be subserved;
7it

and, when the public interest will not be furthered by the inclusion of a par-

ticular activity in the restricted orbit, that'activity should be excluded; see Note,
88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 357 (1934).
SThe accepted judicial definition of the practice of law, in addition to the
conduct of litigation and matters incident thereto, includes conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and, in general, all advice to clients
and all action taken in their behalf in legal matters, even though outside the scope
of the actual litigation of a cause in the courts, e.g., Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga.
511, 162 S.E. 796 (1932); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 404
Ill.
45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399
Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693 (1948); Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E.
313 (1985); Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377
(1939); People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919); State ex rel.
Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 5 S.E.2d 181 (1939).
958 Ohio App. 79, 15 N.E.2d 968 (1937).
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the appropriate blanks, or filled in such blanks, for others in furtherance of a real-estate transaction he was engaged in the practice

of law. 10
Other courts draw a distinction between the preparation of "simple"

instruments, including the selection and filling-in of blank forms in
which "special facts or conditions" are not involved, and the preparation of "complex" instruments which must be shaped from a mass
of facts."

In People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. 12 the New York

Court of Appeals was called upon to determine whether a corporation
which, without giving legal advice, prepares a bill of sale and chattel

mortgage by filling in blanks, upon and in accordance with the
specific direction of a customer, is rendering legal services or holding itself out as entitled to practice law. In making a decision the
court saw no reason why a corporation should be punished for doing
an act that, because of simplicity and lack of confidential character,
can be done by laymen. 1 3 To hold that the prohibition against the

practice of law by unlicensed persons forbids the preparation of all
blank-form instruments would, the court thought, frequently necessitate the use of an attorney when his services were not actually required

Judge Pound, although concurring in the result reached, rejected the
14
basis of the majority holding:

'oCf. People v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App.2d 844, 142 P.2d 960 (1943); Clark v.

Rearden, 231 Mo. App. 666, 104 S.W.2d 407 (1987).
11In re Matthews, 58 Idaho 772, 79 P.2d 535 (1938); In re Eastern Idaho
Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb,
315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943) (alternative holding, in which the actual
practice of the community was said to have an important bearing on the scope of
the practice of law); cf. Gustafson v. V. C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St.
392, 85 N.E.2d 435 (1941).
12227 N. Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919).
"3It is everywhere held that a corporation cannot lawfully engage in the
practice of the law, nor may it be licensed to do so, e.g., In re Eastern Idaho Loan
& Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930); People ex tel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Tax-payers of Illinois, 354 Ill.
102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933)
(rule not varied by fact that corporation was organized not for profit); Judd v.
City Trust & Sav. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937); Land Title &
Abstract Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St, 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934). Nor may it do
so indirectly through the employment of qualified attorneys, ibid. The reason
most frequently assigned for these holdings is that the practice of law by a
corporation would destroy the relation of trust and confidence between attorney
and client, since the corporation would intervene as the employer of the attorney.
See generally Note, 1 WASH. & LEE L. RE:v. 243, 244 (1940).
14See People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 378, 125 N.E.
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"I am unable to rest any satisfactory test on the distinction between simple and complex instruments. The most complex are
simple to the skilled, and the simplest often trouble the inexperienced. Skill is sought when another is employed to do the
work If the blank forms used by the trust companies are prepared or approved by their legal counsel, then, when the clerks
fill them out, the corporation tacitly advises the client that the
forms are proper and sufficient for the purpose ....

This criticism of the feasibility of distinguishing between simple
and complex instruments has been quoted with approval by a number
of courts,' 5 and the distinction as drawn by the majority opinion has
since been repudiated in New York."' It appears to be an accepted
principle that when a layman is acting in the capacity of a mere clerk
or scrivener under the direction of another he is not engaged in the
illegal practice of the law. 17 This acting under orders, however, does
not immunize his employer from attack for practicing the law
without a license, unless his employer is a lawyer.
INCDENTAL VERSUS PBMAtY

Realtors, and others whose business interests incidentally seem to
require the drafting of instruments for clients and customers, contend
that, although the preparation of instruments for others as a primary
business constitutes the practice of the law, such is not the case when
their preparation is ancillary to a legitimate business. It has been
suggested that judicial application of this distinction is but a recognition of the familiar principle that any person may act as his own
lawyer and draft his own agreements.' 8 Another writer is of the
opinion that the holdings in line with this contention involve simply
666, 670 (1919) (concurring opinion).
15E.g., Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee, 142 Tex. 506,
179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932).
' 6People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E.2d 30 (1940).
17See, e.g., People v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App.2d 844, 846, 142 P.2d 960, 962
(1943); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 404 I1. 45, 52, 87
N.E.2d 773, 777 (1949); Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 67,
287 N.W. 377, 381 (1939); cf. Gustafson v. V. C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio
St. 392, 35 N.E.2d 435 (1941) passim. ,
1SHill, Real Estate Brokers and the Courts, 5 LAw & CoNrrmvp. PROB. 72, 75
(1938), citing Copeland v. Dabbs, 221 Ala. 489, 129 So. 88 (1930).
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the giving-way of the policy underlying the restrictions upon the

practice of law to the demands of business practicalities and expediency, since the incidental or primary purpose for which an instrument is drafted obviously is not determinative of the competency
or integrity of the draftsman. 19 Whatever the real basis, the fact is
that a number of courts do recognize the distinction and, further, do
not confine it to the drafting of legal instruments alone but extend it
to include the incidental rendition of legal advice and other types of
20
legal services.
19 See 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 722 (1948).
20
Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1939) (noting specifically that the distinction between the
primary and the incidental is not confined to the drafting of papers); Lowell Bar
Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943) (alternative holding);
Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940) (conveyancing by a
realtor); Cain v. Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719
(1936) (chattel mortgages and bills of sale prepared by trust company); Auerbacher v. Wood, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947) (knowledge of the law possessed by consultant in industrial relations); La Brum v.
Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948) (preparation by title
company of deeds, mortgages, assignments of mortgages, agreements relating to
real estate matters, releases of real estate, and declarations of set-off); see In re
Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524, 532, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 216 (1st Dep't 1948), reversing
188 Misc. 406, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. 1947), 1 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 84
(1948) (legal knowledge of accountant); see People v. Title Guarantee & Trust
Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 378, 125 N.E. 666, 670 (1919) (concurring opinion). Childs
v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 14, 171 Atl. 883, 885 (1934), involving a notary public,
contains the following dictum:
"There can be no objection to the preparation of deeds and mortgages or
other contracts by such [real estate] brokers so long as the papers involved
pertain to and grow out of their business transactions and are intimately connected therewith. The drafting and execution of legal instruments is a necessary concomitant of many businesses and cannot be considered unlawful. Such
practice only falls within the prohibition ...when the documents are drawn
in relation to matters in no manner connected with the immediate business of
the person preparing them . .

.

. A real estate broker is not prohibited from

drawing a deed of conveyance, or other appropriate instrument relating to
property of which he or his associates have negotiated a sale or lease."
Contra: Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377
(1939) (preparation of conveyances of real estate and personal property for
others for a consideration is unauthorized practice of law although done in connection with business of loan broker); Judd v. City Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Ohio
St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937) (trust company illegally practicing law when it
draws wills, trust agreements, and other legal documents for its customers, and
this fact is not altered by the inclusion of the trust company in such instruments
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But even among the courts that accept the distinction of incidental
versus primary work, there is no substantial agreement as to the full
scope of the test. The application of the rule has been limited to
simple instruments, leaving complex ones to licensed attorneys even
though their preparation might, to some extent at least, be considered
incidental to a legitimate business. In Cain v. Merchants National
Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo,21 for example, an injunction was sought
prohibiting a trust company from representing itself to the public
through the medium of advertising as authorized to practice law.
The respondent, through its officers or employees, prepared chattel
mortgages, bills of sale, and crop contracts. In holding that the
respondent had a right to draw chattel mortgages and bills of sale
that involved settlements in which it was interested, or which were
drawn for the purpose of being pledged to it as collateral, but that
it stepped out of its lawful field when it drew such instruments for
the accommodation of its customers in transactions in which it had
22
no interest, the court remarked:

"... a person who is not a member of the bar may draw instru-

ments such as simple deeds, mortgages, promissory notes, and
bills of sale when these instruments are incident to transactions
in which such person is interested provided no charge is made
therefor. These simple instruments are usually prepared upon
or with the aid of printed forms and seldom involve a high degree of legal skill. The drawing of complicated legal instruments such as wills or trust agreements require more legal
knowledge than is possessed by the average layman.... One
who draws such instruments for others practices law even though
such instruments might, to some extent, be incident to a business such as that usually conducted by trust companies."
And in Cowern v. Nelson

23

the Supreme Court of Minnesota held

as fiduciary); cf. Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, Inc., 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d
720 (1947) (preparation of deeds, deeds of trust, mortgages and deeds of release
in connection with the sale of real estate by a real estate broker is not incident of
real estate business, despite rule of court defining illegal practice of law in terms
of preparation of legal instruments other than notices or contracts incident to
regular course of conducting licensed business).
2166 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1986).
221d. at 754, 268 N.W. at 723.
28207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).
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that a realtor might engage in "ordinary conveyancing" as long as no
separate charge was made, since this work was a part of his everyday business. The court did not believe that the harm possibly inflicted on the public from "the rare instances of defective conveyances"
in such transactions was sufficient to offset the public inconvenience
caused by having to call in a lawyer to draft these "simple
instruments."

24

The broad language employed by certain other courts would allow
the layman to draft any instrument, regardless of complexity, as long
25
as this process was ancillary to his business.
CONSYDERATION

Some courts require that the layman perform the ancillary service
free of charge, on pain of being labeled an unauthorized practitioner
of the law. 26 Other courts draw no such distinction and permit the
incidental performance of legal services, although "consideration" is
present.27 It is submitted that this distinction, when made, is un24

Other cases lending support to the proposition that only simple instruments
are contemplated by the incidental-primary test include Judd v. City Trust &
Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1987); Commonwealth v. Jones
& Robbins, Inc., 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947) (preparation of deeds, deeds
of trust, mortgages, and deeds of releases in connection with sale of real estate by
licensed real estate broker is not incident of real estate business, although contracts of sale and contracts giving broker authority to sign for owner are incident,
by virtue of rule of court).
25
E.g., Merrick v. American See. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1939); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52
N.E.2d 27 (1948); Auerbacher v. Wood, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1948); La Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d
246 (1948); see In re Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524, 532, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 216 (1st
Dep't 1948); Childs v. Smeltzer, 815 Pa. 9, 14, 171 At. 883, 885 (1934).
26
E.g., Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940). Some courts
hold that the element of consideration is essential to the practice of law and
must be proved at trial, e.g., State v. Adair, 4 Harr. 585, 156 At 358 (Del. Gen.
Sess. 1922); State v. Bryan, 98 N.C. 644, 4 S.E. 522 (1887); Paul v. Stanley,
168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932); cf. Clark v. Rearden, 231 Mo. App. 666,
104 S.W.2d 407 (1937); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 At. 883 (1934).
Others take the more logical view and turn their decisions on the nature of the
acts and transactions done rather than upon whether they are done for consideration, e.g., State ex rel. Hunter v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N.W. 380 (1937);
State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268 N.W. 95 (1936); Grievance
Committee v. Coryell, 190 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
27
E.g., Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); La
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sound. In the first place, if the requirement is to have any meaning
at all, "consideration" must denote a separate charge, since such
legal services are not in fact rendered free of charge in any event.
The Supreme Court of Texas has aptly pointed out that the furnishing
of incidental legal services constitutes a part of the cost of obtaining
the business transacted and is a part of the total services for which
the customer pays, although not necessarily as an enumerated item.28
In the second place, the presence or absence of consideration can
have no bearing at all on the layman's competence and integrity. If
he is competent to perform legal services as an incident to his business
when he makes no separate charge, he is not any less competent when
he does make such a charge. If a particular court is willing to disregard the policy underlying the basic reason for the restriction upon
the practice of law by allowing a layman to perform legal services
as an incident to his business, logically the way should then be clear
for him to make a separate charge for those services. This is not to
say, of course, that a court should overlook, in the first instance, the
sound grounds of policy that support the restrictions upon the practice
of law.
INHERENT POwER OF TE JUIDICAEY

Although the courts recognize that the legislature in the exercise
of the police power may pass laws in aid of the judicial power in
order to protect the public against imposition, 29 they refuse, in the
Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948).
28
Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee, 142 Tex. 506, 179
S.W.2d 946 (1944).
29
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); Opinion
of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1985); Cowern v. Nelson, 207
Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940); Clark v. Rearden, 231 Mo. App. 666, 104
S.W.2d 407 (1937); State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W.
381 (1941); Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.I. 291, 190 AtL 2 (1937);
Grievance Committee v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). In
Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 134 Fla. 851, 862, 186 So. 280, 285 (1938),
the Florida Court approved "... the nigh universal doctrine that the power to
regulate such matters [admission to the bar] by rule is inherent in the Courts
and cannot be taken from them by the Legislature," while recognizing, however,
that legislative enactments as to admissions will be respected as minimum requirements that do not deprive the courts of their inherent power in the matter.
The Court noted further that: "Dicta in State v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278, and Gould
v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309, may at first blush appear contrary to the
general rule here approved, but careful examination discloses that the dicta in

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol4/iss3/1

10

Daniel and Chase: Real Estate Brokers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
exercise of their inherent power to regulate the practice of law, to
allow the legislature to extend the privilege of practicing law to
persons not admitted to practice by the judicial department. 30 Stated
differently, the legislature may prescribe reasonable minimum requirements for the protection of the public, but it is not empowered
to lower the standards set by the judiciary and to authorize admission
to practice when these inferior requirements are met; the judiciary
has the inherent and exclusive power over admissions to and the
regulation of the practice of the law.
In Florida the excellent cooperation and friendly spirit existing
between the Supreme Court and the Legislature has averted practical
difficulty. The Supreme Court has in practice regulated admission
to the bar, and this year the Legislature specifically quitelaimed whatever powers it may have in this connection. 3 ' It is confidently anticipated that this harmonious relation will continue.
The use of the term inherent is in need of clarification. To the
extent that it suggests an authority higher than and apart from the
Constitution it is a misnomer, as a claim under any such authority is,
of course, unwarranted.32 Neither is the term meant to convey the
thought that the courts have the right to act in only those matters not
covered by statute. 33 Rather, as used by the courts, it connotes a
power reserved to them by the separation-of-powers doctrine under
the Constitution as essential to the existence and orderly functioning
34
of constitutionally created tribunals.
these cases were merely statements of the early common law rule under which
admission to the bar was deemed to be a legislative function, but that it was
under the Act of 4 Hen. IV, Chapter 18, made a judicial function which it

continued to be and was so [sic] when the common law of England was adopted
by statute in this state." See, however, note 39 infra.
3Olbid. See also People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); Judd v. City Trust & Say. Bank,
133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937); Land Title & Abstract Co. v. Dworken,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934); Grievance Committee v. Coryell, 190
S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
3
lFla. Laws 1951, c. 26655, §1, effective May 18, 1951, provides: "The
Supreme Court of the State of Florida shall have the power to prescribe from
time to time the requirements, qualifications and standards to be met and procedures to be followed by all persons for admission to practice law in any of the
Courts of the State of Florida or its political subdivisions."
32

Dowling, The Inherent Power of the judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635 (1935).

33Ibid.
34Ibid. See also cases cited in notes 29 and 80 supra. In Petition of Florida
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This doctrine of "inherent" or "implied" power has not gone without challenge. It has been argued that, while it is true that the courts
could not function properly without lawyers, neither could the legislative and executive departments of the government. Consequently,
the legislative and executive branches should have the same claim
to control over the bar and the practice of law as does the judiciary. 5
This argument, of course, is fallacious. There can be no question that
the courts have the power, however designated, to determine the
qualifications of attorneys who appear before them and to punish
intruders, since such attorneys are in a very real sense officers of the
court, and regulation of their activity is clearly within the orbit of the
judiciary.3,
Neither the legislative nor the executive branches, however, require
the appearance of attorneys as such before them; indeed, when an
attorney does appear before a legislative committee, he is officially
known as a lobbyist. Difficulty is encountered, if at all, when the
courts go further and take the position that the practice of law over
which the power exists is not confined to matters coming directly
within the purview of the courts.3 7 Historically, the admission to
the practice of law and the regulation of that practice have been
judicially determined, albeit by virtue of early enactments of ParliaState Bar Ass'n, 40 So.2d 902, 905 (Fla. 1949), the Florida Court indicated that it
recognized fully the nature of the so-called inherent power: "Inherent power
arises from the fact of the Court's creation or from the fact .that it is a court.
It is essential to its being and dignity and does not require an express grant to
confer it. Under our form of government it is the right that each department of
government has to execute the powers falling naturally within its orbit when not
expressly placed or limited by the existence of a similar power in one of the other
departments."
35

Beardsley, The Judicial Claim to Inherent Power over the Bar, 19 A.B.A.J.

509 (1933).
3
6See 95 U. or PA. L. REv. 218 (1946). In re Clifton, 115 Fla. 168, 155 So.
324 (1934), the Florida Court recognized that an attorney is an officer of the
court exercising a privilege of franchise although he does not hold an office of
public trust in the constitutional or statutory sense of that term. See also Petition
of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1949); Baruch v. Giblen [sic],
122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831 (1935); 3 BL. COMI. *26.
37
See In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 395, 240 N.W. 441, 449 (1932), in which
it was assumed that the legislature might completely curtail a portion of the
judicial power by distinguishing between "officers of the court" and practitioners
outside the courtroom. See also 33 CoL. L. REPv. 1072 (1933); 95 U. oF PA. L.
B v. 218 (1946); 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1021 (1932).
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ment. 38 It can plausibly and forcefully be argued that Parliament,
in allowing the courts thus to regulate the practice, recognized that

such regulation was properly a judicial function, since Parliament is
the supreme authority in England and is therefore more nearly analogous to our constitutional convention than to our legislature.3 9 The

difficulty is, however, that the practice of law at that time was more
restricted in scope than it is today and consisted primarily in the representation of clients in matters pertaining to litigation.

The plain fact, nevertheless, is that the courts today, on grounds of
essential policy, do consider the regulation of the practice of law as
40
now defined a prerogative of the judiciary.

Txim MEMPms

AcREEmENT

On May 5, 1942, a National Conference of Realtors and Lawyers,

composed of lawyer-members of the American Bar Association and
realtors appointed by the President of the National Association of
Real Estate Boards, was organized in Memphis, Tennessee, and immediately formulated a statement of principles 41 subsequently ap38

Discussion of the early English statutes may be found in State ex rel. Wolfe
v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278, 95 Am. Dec. 314 (1868); Yeats, Need for Regulating the
Practice of Law in Florida, and the Power and Duty of Our Supreme Court in
the Premises, 12 FL&. L.J. 96, 99 (1988).
39
Dowling, supra note 32. Yeats, supra note 88 at 100, notes that it must be
remembered that ".

.

. Parliament has from ancient times exercised all three

powers of government as we know them, so, in examining into English 'statutes,'
it is always necessary to inquire into the essential nature of the subject-matter
dealt with."
40
See cases cited in notes 29 and 30 supra. Although matters of "policy" are
properly determined by the legislature within the field of jurisdiction assigned
to it by a constitution, matters of constitutional "policy" are decided by the
judiciary; and if constitutional change is needed the electorate must decide the
issue via the specified amending process.
41The agreement is set out in full in 14 UNAuTH. Prec. NEws No. 3, p. 27
(1948). Before the promulgation of the Memphis Agreement, the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of the Law had
taken the view that the realtor could neither draft nor select instruments that
affected the rights and interests of the parties to a real estate transaction, regardless of whether this work was incidental to his principal business or whether a
separate charge was made. The Committee reasoned that the broker had an
interest adverse not only to the party whom he did not represent but also to the
party in whose behalf he did act, since his interest would be favored if neither
of the parties he was bringing together obtained independent counsel or advice
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proved by both the American Bar Association and the National Association of Real Estate Boards. Article I of the agreement provides: 42
"(1.) The realtor shall not practice law or give legal advice directly or indirectly; he shall not act as a public conveyancer,
nor give advice or opinions as to the legal effect of legal instruments, nor give opinions concerning the validity of title to real
estate, and he shall not prevent or discourage any party to a
real estate transaction from employing the services of a lawyer.
(2.) The realtor shall not undertake to draw or prepare documents fixing and defining the legal rights of parties to a transaction. However, when acting as a broker, a realtor may use
an earnest money contract form for the protection of either party
against unreasonable withdrawal from the transaction, provided
that such earnest money contract form, as well as any other
standard legal forms used by the broker in transacting such business, shall first have been approved and promulgated for such
use, by the Bar Association and the Real Estate Board, in the
locality where the forms are to be used.
(8.) The realtor shall not seek to participate in the lawyer's fees,
or in any way seek to influence the lawyer's compensation in real
estate transactions in which the lawyer is consulted as legal
counsel."
Article II seeks to limit the activity of the lawyer in real estate transactions and provides, in fine, that he will not volunteer his opinion
concerning the business prudence of real estate transactions in which
his services as legal counsel are used, that he will not seek to participate in or influence the realtor's compensation in such transactions,
and that a lawyer who engages in business activities ordinarily undertaken by a realtor should qualify under the Real Estate License Law
of his state, unless he is acting for himself as principal or fiduciary.
The third and final article defines the aims of the joint Conference
to be, among other things, consideration and attempted disposal of
any controversies referred to it between realtors and lawyers, proor made or had made an independent inquiry into the state of the title, the
suitability of the instrument and its provisions to state the parties' agreement, or

any other matter that might delay or prevent consummation of the transaction;
see 62 A.B.A. RE. 769, 778 (1987); 61 A.B.A. EP. 704, 710 (1986).
4214 UNAm.

PnAc. NEws No. 3,p. 27 (1948).
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mulgation of such other statements of principle as may be agreed
upon, and rendition of assistance in any advisory capacity by local
and state bar associations and real estate boards in carrying out the
principles agreed upon by the Conference.
The National Conference of Realtors and Lawyers is the result of
the long-time effort of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law to treat the unlawfulpractice-of-law problem through the medium of friendly and cooperative action. 43 Although such agreements are not binding on
the courts in the determination of what constitutes the practice of
law, it has been held that they will be judicially noticed and that they
raise ". . . the strongest presumption that in general no present cause
of complaint .. .with respect to minor and collateral matters now
44
exists."
THE KEYES CASE
Against this background of legal thought the Supreme Court of
Florida in May, 1950, decided Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Association,45 the only unauthorized practice case yet to reach it. The
decree below specifically enjoined the Keyes Company, a licensed real
estate broker, from preparing leases, lease agreements, rental contracts, deeds, mortgages, and contracts for the sale of property, including filling in printed forms or causing them to be executed, unless the instruments were drawn in transactions in which it was acquiring, mortgaging, leasing, or selling its own property or lending
its own money. In general terms it prohibited any other act constituting the practice of law. 46 On appeal, the Supreme Court looked
to the Real Estate License Law 47 in order to determine what acts a
realtor is authorized to perform, found that the law contemplated the
performance of acts preliminary in nature, and held that a realtor may
43
See, e.g., 67 A.B.A. REP. 218 (1942); 70 A.B.A. Ra. 257, 259 (1945);
63 A.B.A. REP. 322, 325 (1938).

44

People ex rel. Committee on Grievances v. Denver Clearing House Banks,
99 Colo. 50, 52, 59 P.2d 468, 469 (1936).
4546 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1950), the subject of favorable comment at 4 VAND.
L. REv. 344 (1951).
46
See Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46
So.2d 605 (Fla. 1950).
47
FLA. STAT. §475.01(2)

(1949).
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prepare those instruments or papers that record his legitimate handiwork in real estate transactions as contemplated by the Real Estate
License Law, leaving other steps utlimnately to be taken in the hands of
the parties or, in the event they desire representation, of their lawyers.
By way of illustration, the Court noted that when a broker is employed
to find a purchaser of property his function is performed when he
produces a prospective purchaser, ready, willing and able to buy, or
procures from him a binding contract. In such a case the realtor is
restricted in the drafting of papers ".... to those, such as a memorandum, deposit receipt, or the contract, as the case may be, recording
his handiwork - that is, the bringing together of buyer and seller." 48
Justice Terrell, joined by Justice Hobson, dissented on the ground
that the Legislature, in the Real Estate License Law, impliedly
authorized the real estate broker to execute a blank deed or any other
instrument mentioned in the lower court's decree; 4 9 and summarized
his disagreement as follows:5 ° "I never heard of a 'sale' or 'closing'
the sale of real estate that did not contemplate a deed and it is common knowledge that the legislature so contemplated when it passed
the act."
Analysis of the Keyes decision indicates that both the majority and
dissenting opinions were concerned with statutory construction. The
dissenting opinion necessarily assumes that the Legislature is supreme
in the premises; the majority opinion, although based on a careful
consideration of the function of the realtor in our society as portrayed
by the Real Estate License Law, has not ruled out the possibility of
a future holding that the Supreme Court has the inherent and exclusive power to define and regulate the practice of law.51 It does
not necessarily follow from the majority opinion that, had the Legislature spelled out the authority of the realtor to draft deeds, mortgages and other instruments not preliminary in nature, the Court
would have acquiesced in the legislative declaration of policy. On
the other hand, neither did the majority commit the Court to the
inherent-or-implied-power doctrine. The probability, in view of
48

49

Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d 605, 606 (Fla. 1950).
See id. at 607 (dissenting opinion), referring to FLA. STAT. §475.01(2)

(1949).
5

gSee id. at 608 (dissenting opinion).
1n fact, Justice Terrell was of the opinion that the majority "crawled over
on the legislative side of the fence where Judges are forbidden to be," Keyes
Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d 605, 607 (Fla. 1950).
51
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its past declarations,5 2 is that the Florida Court will assert such a

power in unauthorized practice situations once the issue is squarely
presented.
CONCLUSION

It is at once apparent that there are rather striking similarities between the holding in the Keyes case and certain portions of the
Memphis Agreement. Both contemplate the performance of acts by
the realtor that fall short of a conveyance or final disposition of a
particular transaction, and both proceed upon the proposition that
lawyers and realtors operate in separate, ascertainable spheres. The
agreement confines the realtor to the use of an earnest-money contract,
which may or may not be specifically enforceable; the Keyes holding
allows the realtor to draft such instruments as are necessary to record
his handiwork, including earnest-money contracts. Under the Florida
holding, however, the realtor is not confined to earnest-money contracts. Hence the holding allows realtors more latitude than does the
agreement.
It is difficult to find fault with the decision of the Florida Court,
provided that the problem is one of statutory construction; but the
result reached may fall far short of protecting the rights of the parties.
Their rights are fixed by the contract of sale; and if a lawyer thereafter enters the transaction he may find his entry too late to secure
for his client, whether buyer or seller, the rights expected, and which
might have been embodied in the contract.
Much more is involved in a real estate sale than a simple transfer

of title to real property. Not infrequently the effectuation of the
intention of the parties to a realty transaction involves creation of
vested and contingent remainders, springing and shifting uses, deeds
to take effect in the future, the law of homestead, easements, legal
and equitable mortgages, mechanics' and materialmen's liens, county
and city taxes, special assessments and zoning regulations, as well as

other more or less complicated legal devices and concepts. Further,
when married persons are parties to the transaction, there is always
the problem of dower and the question whether the deed should
be made to the husband or the wife solely or to the husband and
wife as tenants by the entirety. Consideration of the law of federal
52

See notes 29 and 34 supra.
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and state taxation should also enter the picture before the rights of
the parties are finally determined.
Finally, the real estate broker does not draw the contract of sale
or binder merely because he wishes to give legal advice; he probably
does so because he wishes tangible evidence that he has closed the
deal and thus earned his commission. At best, the question is debatable whether a broker who represents the seller, as is usually the
case, and who has a direct financial interest in the consummation of
the deal, should be permitted to draft the contract that determines
the rights of the parties when the buyer has no legal adviser.
The Florida Court is to be commended for attempting to reach
a practical solution of the differences between lawyers and realtors.
One may well question, however, whether, in seeking to resolve the
conflict between real estate brokers and lawyers, the Court accorded
due weight to the paramount right of the public to be able to rely
with confidence upon the legal competence of anyone authorized to
render advice on legal matters.
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